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Abstract 
Inaction inertia occurs when missing an attractive opportunity (vs. not having been offered it) 
decreases the likelihood of acting on another similar opportunity. We experimentally 
manipulated future time perspective to reduce inaction inertia. Middle-aged and older adults 
from the Health and Retirement Study were randomly assigned to imagining restricted or 
expansive time left to live, or to no instructions. Across age, imagining a restricted future (v. the 
other two instructions) reduced inaction inertia and future time perspective. Imagining living 
longer increased future time perspective among relatively younger participants.  Consequences 
of restricted time perspective for decisions and life regrets are discussed.   
 
Key Words: future time perspective; motivation; decision making; inaction inertia; regret  
  
Restricting Future Time Perspective 3 
 
Restricting Future Time Perspective Reduces Failure to Act after a Missed Opportunity  
Most life regrets stem from inaction rather than from action (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). 
Inaction inertia occurs when failing to act after missing an attractive opportunity versus not 
(Tykocinski, Pittman, & Tuttle, 1995). For instance, a missed opportunity to purchase a desired 
item at a 50% discount reduced consumers¶ZLOOLQJQHVVto purchase the same item later at a 20% 
discount compared to when the first discount was not missed (Arkes, Kung & Hutzel, 2002; 
Zeelenberg, Nijstad, van Putten, & van Dijk, 2006). Inaction inertia is posited to stem from 
regret about past inaction (Tykocinski & Ortmann, 2011). Inducing rumination about regretting 
past inaction increased inaction inertia (van Putten, Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 2007, 2009). By 
comparison, making it more difficult to associate a past purchasing opportunity with a present 
one by narrowing eligibility for the past discount reduced inaction inertia (van Putten et al., 
2007, 2009). Focusing on the past has also been posited to promote sunk-cost bias, which 
involves throwing good money after bad due to concerns about irretrievable losses from the past 
(Thaler, 1980; Tykocinski & Ortmann, 2011). Less rumination about past failures decreased 
sunk-cost bias (Bruine de Bruin, Strough, & Parker, 2014; Strough, Schlosnagle & DiDonato, 
2011), as did instructions to imagine a restricted future, which presumably shifted thoughts away 
from the past (Strough, Schlosnagle, Karns, Lemaster, & Pichayayothin, 2014).  
Socioemotional selectivity theory posits that older adults have limited future time 
perspective, or a sense of less time remaining until death (Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz & Charles, 1999). 2OGHUDGXOWV¶limited future time perspective is theorized to 
motivate prioritization of better emotional well-being LQWKH³KHUHDQGQRZ´ (Carstensen et al., 
2011).  
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Much research on future time perspective uses correlational rather than experimental 
methods (see Loeckenhoff & Rutt¶V 2015 review). In experiments, future time perspective is 
limited when ending of life (or life stages) are cued, for example by imagining limited life 
expectancy (e.g., Allemand, 2008) or moving across the country alone (Frederickson & 
Carstensen, 1990). Only two experiments examined whether limiting future time perspective 
affected decisions. The first found that college students who imagined shorter lifetimes had less 
sunk-cost bias than a control group (Strough et al., 2014). The second found that limiting future 
time perspective through imagining a move (vs. expanded life expectancy) increased choices for 
low-arousal health care options (Jiang, Fung, Sims, Tsai, & Zhang, 2016).  
Experiments that limit (vs. expand) future time perspective have demonstrated effects on 
outcomes other than decisions. Restricting future time perspective by imagining moving across 
the country alone (vs. no-instruction control) increased preferences for spending time with more 
familiar partners among adults of all ages (Frederickson & Carstensen, 1990). It also increased 
forgiveness towards friends among younger and older adults, compared to imagining living 20 
years longer than expected and a no-instruction control group (Cheng & Yim, 2008). Among 
younger and older adults, imagining a limited (vs. expanded) life expectancy also increased 
forgiveness towards a friend (Allemand, 2008) and recall of positive over negative pictures 
(Barber, Opitz, Martins, Sakaki, & Mather, 2016).  
Although experimentally limiting future time perspective has consistently promoted 
choices that maximize positive emotions, findings about expanding future time perspective are 
mixed. Expanding time perspective through instructions to imagine living 20 years longer than 
expected (vs. no instruction) decreased ROGHUDGXOWV¶preferences for familiar partners (Fung, 
Carsensen, & Lutz, 1999). Yet, a study that used the same manipulation with somewhat older 
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participants in their seventies and eighties found no difference (Segerstrom, Geiger, Combs, & 
Boggero, 2016). Expanding future time perspective by imagining living 20 years longer than 
expected (vs. no-instruction control) decreased forgiveness in older but not in younger adults 
(Cheng & Yim, 2008). These unexpected findings have been attributed to µexpansive¶ 
instructions being less effective for younger people who already perceive an expansive future 
(Cheng & Yim, 2008) and to older DGXOWV¶social preferences depending on whether loved ones 
also have an expanded life expectancy (Segerstrom et al., 2016). Moreover, imagining living 20 
more years may seem unrealistic to people in their eighties. One study showed that instructions 
to imagine living 120 years (vs. a restricted life expectancy) increased future time perspective 
similarly among those aged 18-35 years and 60-74 years (Barber et al., 2016). However, because 
a no-instruction control group was not included, it is unclear whether the limited instruction 
decreased future time perspective, the expansive instruction increased future time perspective, or 
both.  
For the two studies that examined whether future time perspective instructions affect 
decisions, results were also mixed for expanding future time perspective. Among college 
students, expanding future time perspective by imagining a long life did not affect sunk-cost bias 
as compared to a control group (Strough et al., 2014). The other study had no control group, 
leaving it unclear whether the instructions to expand vs. limit future time perspective produced 
the reported effects (Jiang et al., 2016). 
The Current Study 
Here, we investigated whether restricted and expansive future time perspective 
manipulations affect inaction inertia compared to a no-instruction control group, thus examining 
effects of each separately. We recruited a national sample of middle-aged and older adults, while 
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prior research on this topic used student samples (e.g., Tykocinski et al., 1995; Zeelenberg et al., 
2006) or convenience samples of adults of unspecified ages (Kumar, 2004; Tsiros, 2009). 
Behavioral decision-making phenomena are not necessarily consistent across the life span 
(Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012). Specifically, our research questions were: 
1. Does the effectiveness of instructions for changing future time perspective vary with age 
in a sample of middle-aged and older adults?  
2. Is inaction inertia present in a national sample of middle-aged and older adults?  
3. Do experimental manipulations of future time perspective affect inaction inertia and does 
their influence vary with age? 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 719 middle-aged and older adults was randomly selected from the U.S. 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS, Juster & Suzman, 1995). The HRS is a longitudinal study of 
approximately 20,000 U.S. adults age 50 and older conducted by the University of Michigan, 
with funding from the National Institute on Aging and Social Security Administration 
(https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/documentation). The final sample included 700 adults (M age =66.74, 
SD = 10.95 yrs, 31-94 yrs) most of whom were women (55%), White/Caucasian (79%) and non-
Hispanic (90%). Nineteen participants were excluded because they skipped the three future time 
perspective items. They were significantly older than their 700 counterparts (M = 75.95, SD = 
11.81 vs. M = 66.74, SD = 10.95) F (1, 718) = 13.03, p < .05, but did not differ in gender or race 
(p>.10). 
Biannual HRS surveys since 1992 have included experimental modules about emergent 
issues. Our 2014 HRS module is available online 
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(http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/modules/meta/2014/core/qnaire/online/Module_3.pdf and 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/modules/meta/2014/core/codebook/h14_00.html). Participants 
were randomly assigned to a face-to-face or telephone interview, which did not affect the results. 
Participants were paid $80-$100 for participation in the 2014 HRS. The study was approved by 
the 8QLYHUVLW\RI0LFKLJDQ¶VInstitutional Review Board.  
Procedure and Measures  
Participants were randomly assigned to restrictive or expansive future time perspective 
instructions, or no instructions. Following prior research (Allemand, 2008; Fung et al., 1999; 
Strough et al., 2014), the restrictive group (n=220) was asked to ³imagine that because of a 
critical illness, you have not much longer to live.´ The expansive group (n=244) was asked to 
³imagine that last week you found out from your doctor about a new medical advance that 
ensures that you will enjoy many more years beyond the age you expected to live in reasonably 
good health.´We did not ask participants to imagine OLYLQJ³PRUH\HDUV,´as it could seem 
unrealistic to older adults. The control group (n=236) received no instruction.  
Next, participants ZHUHWROG³Imagine that you would like to have a couch in your room.´
They received two scenarios from Zeelenberg et al. (2006) about purchasing opportunities.1 The 
first scenario described a missed opportunity to purchase a desired new couch at a 50% discount, 
and a 20% discount available next week. The second scenario only described the 20% discount 
on the desired couch next week. After reading each scenario, participants were asked, ³+RZ
OLNHO\ZRXOG\RXEHWRZDLWWREX\WKHFRXFKXVLQJWKHGLVFRXQWQH[WZHHN"´ They rated 
purchasing likelihood on a six-point scale (1=very unlikely to wait to buy the couch, 6=very 
                                                          
1
 A separate group (n=737) saw two sunk-cost scenarios from Strough et al. (2014). Sunk-cost 
bias was evident, but the instructions did not alter future time perspective while making the 
decision or influence sunk-cost bias (see online supplement). 
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likely to wait to buy the couch). Lower ratings on the first scenario relative to the second indicate 
inaction inertia.  
Finally, three manipulation check items assessed the effectiveness of the restrictive and 
expansive future time perspective instructions relative to no instruction, using a six-point scale 
(1=very untrue, 6=very true): two items from Carstensen and Lang (1996; ³,KDYHDVHQVHWLPH
is running out; As I get older, I begin to experience time as limited´) and one from Strough et al. 
(2016, ³,KDYHOLPLWHGWLPHOHIWWROLYHP\OLIH´. HRS survey time precluded using more items, 
so we selected a cohesive set that matched our manipulation of perceived life expectancy (Fung 
& Isaacowitz, 2016; Rohr, John, Fung, & Lang, 2017; Strough et al., 2016). Internal consistency 
was sufficient to average ratings (Į . Higher ratings indicated perceiving a more limited 
future while making the decision.   
Covariates 
 Health. Self-reported health was assessed on a 5-point scale (1 =  excellent, 2 =  very 
good, 3 =  good, 4 =  fair, or 5 =  poor; Lawton, Moss, Fulcomer, & Kleban, 1982).  
 Fluid Cognitive ability. HRS assessed fluid cognitive ability through immediate recall 
(of 10 listed words), delayed recall (same list), backward counting (from 20 to 10), and serial 7s 
(starting with 100, sequentially subtract 7 five times). The sum of correct items across tasks 
yielded a score between 0 and 27. Higher scores indicated greater fluid cognitive ability 
(Crimmins, Kim, Langa, & Weir, 2011). 
Results  
Does the effectiveness of instructions for changing future time perspective vary with age in 
a sample of middle-aged and older adults?  
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A hierarchical linear regression tested whether instructions changed future time 
perspective and interacted with age (see online supplement for correlations). Step 1 included two 
experimental group dummy codes (comparing the restrictive group to the other two, and the 
expansive group to the other two), a continuous age variable, and covariates for perceived health 
and fluid cognitive ability. Step 2 added interaction terms between age and each experimental 
JURXS¶Vdummy code to test moderation of instructions by age. 
The restrictive group (M=3.96, SE=.12) reported significantly shorter future time 
perspectives than the no-instruction control (M=3.31, SE=.12) and expansive (M=3.17, SE=.11) 
groups, B=.18, SE= .17, t=4.38, p < .0001). The dummy code for the expansive group was 
nonsignificant, t=-.46, p=.64. After accounting for covariates and dummy codes, the association 
between older age and shorter future time perspective was not significant (B=.07, SE= .01, 
t=1.78, p = .08). Both covariates, worse perceived health (B=.15, SE=.07, t = 3.97, p <.001) and 
poorer fluid cognitive abilities (B=-.12, SE=.02, t = -2.92 p <.01), were significantly associated 
with perceiving shorter future time.  
At Step 2, there was a significant interaction between age and the expansive (B=.51, 
SE=.02, t=2.03, p =.04), but not the restrictive (B=-.18, SE= .02, t=-.66, p=.51) instruction 
(Figure 1).2 That is, future time perspective was significantly less limited in the expansive group 
compared to the restrictive and control groups among participants who were relatively younger 
rather than older.3    
                                                          
2
 When included to assess potential nonlinear effects, quadratic and cubic functions of age were 
nonsignificant. 
3
 Following Hayes and Montoya (2017), we computed the Johnson-Neyman region of 
significance, which suggested that groups differed significantly among participants younger but 
not older than age 52. The Johnson-Neyman procedure was designed to identify the specific 
values at which groups differed significantly, unlike a simple slopes approach that examines 
differences at arbitrary values like plus or minus one standard deviation from the mean.   
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Is inaction inertia present in a national sample of middle-aged and older adults? 
Participants displayed inaction inertia by being less willing to act on the attractive 
opportunity of buying a couch at discount, after missing the earlier opportunity (M =4.28, 
SE=.08) rather than not (M=4.71, SE=.07), F (1,699)=36.33, pȘ2p=.05. 
Do experimental manipulations of future time perspective affect inaction inertia and does 
their effectiveness vary with age?  
We computed a linear mixed model on willingness to purchase, with a within-subject 
factor for whether it was measured after missing the earlier opportunity versus not, a between-
subject factor for assigned instructions (restrictive, expansive, control), and age measured as a 
continuous variable. Covariates were perceived health and fluid cognitive ability.  
The first answer to this research question was seen in a significant main effect of 
instructions (F (2,694)=10.54, pȘ2p=.03) which indicated that the restrictive instruction 
(M=4.05, SE=.11) reduced willingness to wait to purchase at a discount compared to the other 
two groups (expansive M=4.65, SE=.12, control M=4.76, SE=.12, respectively) who did not 
differ from each other. However, this was qualified by an interaction of whether or not the earlier 
opportunity had been missed F (2,694)=6.55, p=.001Ș2p=.02.  Follow-up paired t-tests to isolate 
the interaction showed inaction inertia only for participants receiving control (t(235)=-6.01, 
p<.001) and expansive (t(243)=-3.38, p=.001) instructions, with reported purchasing likelihood 
being significantly lower after missing the earlier opportunity rather than not (see Figure 2). 
However, restrictive instructions led to similar reported purchasing likelihood after missing the 
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earlier opportunity rather than not, t(219)=-.99, p=.32, suggesting that imagining a restricted 
future reduced inaction inertia.4  
The second answer to the research question was seen in the three-way interaction 
between age, assigned instructions, and whether the earlier opportunity had been missed was not 
significant, F(2,694) = 1.48, p=.23, indicating that the instructions were similarly effective 
across age. 
When considering covariates, we found no significant relationship between perceived 
health and purchasing likelihood, while greater fluid cognition was associated with increased 
purchasing likelihood, regardless of whether or not the earlier opportunity had been missed, F 
(1,694)=9.54, p=.002Ș2p=.01 (see online supplement).   
Discussion 
We tested whether experimentally manipulating future time perspective influenced 
inaction inertia, or failing to act on an attractive opportunity after having missed another. 
Restricted future time perspective instructions reduced inaction inertia relative to expansive 
                                                          
4
 Follow-up mediation analyses using +D\HV¶8) PROCESS macro for a multi-categorical 
predictor variable examined whether experimental group differences in purchasing likelihood 
when the sale had been missed were accounted for by future time perspective. Two dummy 
codes (comparing the restrictive group to the other two, and the expansive group to the other 
two) were used. As in the primary analyses, the dummy code that compared the restrictive group 
to the other two was significant but the dummy code that compared the expansive group to the 
other two was not.  Specifically, purchasing likelihood was lower in the restrictive group 
compared to the expansive and control group (b=-.39, se=.20, p=.05). The restrictive group 
perceived more limited future time compared to the expansive and control group (b=.72, se=.17, 
p<.0001). However, more limited future time was associated with greater purchasing likelihood 
(b=.16, se=.04, p=.0003). Accordingly, the direct effect of the restrictive instructions on reduced 
purchasing likelihood was stronger (b=-.51, se=.20, p=.01) after accounting for the indirect effect 
through limited future time (b=.12, se=.04), indicating suppression. Thus, group differences in 
purchasing likelihood were not accounted for by future time perspective. A test of moderated 
mediation indicated that the direct and indirect paths between the experimental groups and 
purchasing likelihood were not moderated by age.  
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instructions and no-instruction controls. These results align with prior studies of college students 
which showed that restricting future time perspective changed decisions whereas expanding it 
had no effect (Strough et al., 2014). Thus, effects of future time perspective manipulations 
generalized to a different type of decision and an older adult sample.  
Our findings add to two prior experiments on future time perspective and decision 
making (Jiang et al., 2016; Strough et al., 2014). Both inaction inertia and sunk-cost bias are said 
to reflect a failure to let go of the past (Tykocinski & Ortmann, 2011). Imagining a limited life 
expectancy may be incompatible with worrying about the past thereby decreasing inaction inertia 
and sunk-cost bias (van Putten et al., 2009). Effects of imagining a limited life expectancy were 
even stronger after accounting for future time perspective, perhaps by controlling for naturally 
occurring variation in future time perspective. Imagining a limited life expectancy could change 
decision-making processes beyond the ones we examined, by for example reducing regret (van 
Putten et al., 2009), construing events as more concrete (Trope & Lieberman, 2000), or focusing 
more RQWKH³KHUHDQGQRZ,´ as socioemotional theory posits (Carstensen, 2006).5 Additional 
research is needed to identify mechanisms whereby imagining a limited life expectancy affects 
decisions.  
Imagining a limited life expectancy reduced future time perspective. Imagining living 
longer increased future time perspective only among relatively younger participants, without 
affecting inaction inertia. Elsewhere, we found the same instructions to be effective for 
UHVWULFWLQJFROOHJHVWXGHQWV¶WLPHSHUVSHFWLYHEXWineffective for expanding it (Strough et al., 
                                                          
5
 Experiments of future time perspective ask participants to think of themselves as having 
restrictive or expansive life expectancy while considering the same events. Experiments of 
temporal construal ask participants to think of events as being in the present or in the future. 
Though instructions differ, it would be worthwhile to explore whether manipulating future time 
perspective affects construal levels 
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2014). Limited life expectancy instructions may be more powerful than expansive ones, in part 
because expansive instructionVGHSHQGRQWKHSHUVRQ¶Vsubjective life expectancy prior to the 
instruction (Rappange, Brouwer, & van Exel, 2016).  
A strength of our study was the use of a national sample and experimental methods to 
investigate future time perspective. Whereas prior inaction inertia research was based mostly on 
college students, our findings suggest that inaction inertia is a robust phenomenon replicable in 
an age diverse sample. Yet, because our youngest participants were in their thirties, differences 
in inaction inertia and the effectiveness of restricted future time perspective in reducing it across 
the full age spectrum remain unclear. Our cross-sectional sample precludes distinguishing age-
related change from cohort effects (Schaie, 1965). Our scenarios likely underestimated emotional 
reactions to missed opportunities because they were hypothetical. Further research is needed to 
examine whether focusing on the future helps people to ruminate less about past inaction 
(Wrosch, Bauer, & Scheier, 2005).  
Additional research could also investigate whether imagining a restricted future helps 
people to overcome other instances of inaction inertia, such as refusing to sell poorly performing 
stocks after missing an opportunity to do so (Tycokinski, Israel, & Pittman, & 2004), and other 
types of decisions (Klapproth, 2008; Lockenhoff & Rutt, 2015). 
Our findings have implications for research on behavioral decision making and life-span 
psychology.  Encouraging a focus on a restricted future after missing an attractive opportunity 
helped people to overcome a failure to act when given a second chance. Moreover, imagining a 
restricted future may be useful when missing experiences rather than material goods, because 
regret over inaction is greater for the former than the latter (Rosenzweig & Gilovich, 2012). Of 
course, people do not regret all inaction because not all missed options are attractive (van Putten, 
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2013). Ultimately, helping people to seize second chances (even if they may be rare) may reduce 
life regrets and enhance psychological well-being across the life span.  
Restricting Future Time Perspective 15 
 
References 
Allemand, M. (2008). Age differences in forgiveness: The role of future time perspective. 
Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 1137-1147. 
Arkes, H. R., Kung, Y., & Hutzel, L. (2002). Regret, valuation, and inaction inertia. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 87(2), 371-385. 
doi:10.1006/obhd.2001.2978 
Barber, S., Opitz, P., Martins, B., Sakaki, M., & Mather, M. (2016). Thinking about a limited 
future enhances the positivity of younger and older adults' recall: Support for 
socioemotional selectivity theory. Memory & Cognition, 44(6), 869-882. 
doi:10.3758/s13421-016-0612-0 
Bruine de Bruin, W., Strough, J., & Parker, $0*HWWLQJROGHULVQ¶WDOOWKDWEDG%HWWHU
GHFLVLRQVDQGFRSLQJZKHQIDFLQJ³VXQNFRVWV´Psychology and Aging, 29, 642-649. 
DOI: 10.1037/a0036308 
Carstensen, L. L. (2006). The influence of a sense of time on human development. Science, 
312(5782), 1913-1915. doi: 10.1126/science.1127488 
Carstensen, L. L., & Lang, F. R. (1996). Future Time Perspective Scale. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University. 
Carstensen, L. L., & Mikels, J. A. (2005). At the Intersection of Emotion and Cognition: Aging 
and the Positivity Effect. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(3), 117-121. 
doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00348.x 
Caruso, E. M., Van Boven, L., Chin, M., & Ward, A. (2013). The temporal Doppler effect: 
When the future feels closer than the past. Psychological Science, 24(4), 530-536. 
doi:10.1177/0956797612458804 
Restricting Future Time Perspective 16 
 
Cheng, S., & Yim, Y. (2008). Age differences in forgiveness: The role of future time 
perspective. Psychology and Aging, 23(3), 676-680. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.23.3.676 
Crimmins, E. M., Kim, J. K., Langa, K. M., & Weir, D. R. (2011). Assessment of cognition 
using surveys and neuropsychological assessment: The Health and Retirement Study and 
the Aging, Demographics, and Memory Study. The Journals Of Gerontology: Series B: 
Psychological Sciences And Social Sciences, 66(Suppl 1), 162-171. 
doi:10.1093/geronb/gbr048 
Dassen, F. C., Jansen, A., Nederkoorn, C., & Houben, K. (2016). Focus on the future: Episodic 
future thinking reduces discount rate and snacking. Appetite, 96327-332. 
doi:10.1016/j.appet.2015.09.032 
Fredrickson, B. L., & Carstensen, L. L. (1990). Choosing social partners: How old age and 
anticipated endings make people more selective. Psychology and Aging, 5(3), 335-347. 
doi:10.1037/0882-7974.5.3.335 
Fung, H. H., Carstensen, L. L., & Lutz, A. M. (1999). Influence of time on social preferences: 
Implications for life-span development. Psychology and Aging, 14(4), 595-604. 
doi:10.1037/0882-7974.14.4.595 
Gilovich, T., & Medvec, V. H. (1995). The experience of regret: What, when, and why. 
Psychological Review, 102(2), 379-395. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.102.2.379 
Grühn, D., Sharifian, N., & Chu, Q. (2015). The limits of a limited future time perspective in 
explaining age differences in emotional functioning. Psychology and Aging, 
doi:10.1037/pag0000060 
Restricting Future Time Perspective 17 
 
Hayes, A. F., & Montoya, A. K. (2017). A Tutorial on Testing, Visualizing, and Probing an 
Interaction Involving a Multicategorical Variable in Linear Regression Analysis. 
Communication Methods & Measures, 11(1), 1-30. doi:10.1080/19312458.2016.1271116 
Jiang, D., Fung, H. H., Sims, T., Tsai, J. L., & Zhang, F. (2016). Limited time perspective 
increases the value of calm. Emotion, 16(1), 52-62. doi:10.1037/emo0000094 
Juster, F. T., & Suzman, R. (1995). An overview of the Health and Retirement Study. Journal of 
Human Resources, S7-S56. 
Kellough, J. L., & .QLJKW%*3RVLWLYLW\HIIHFWVLQROGHUDGXOWV¶SHUFHSWLRQRIIDFLDO
emotion: The role of future time perspective. The Journals of Gerontology, Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 67, 150-158. 
Klapproth, F. (2008). Time and decision making in humans. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 8(4), 509-524. doi:10.3758/CABN.8.4.509 
Lawton, M.P., Moss, M.S., Fulcomer, M., & Kleban, M.H. (1982). A research and service 
oriented multilevel assessment instrument. Journal of Gerontology, 37, 91±99. 
Löckenhoff, C. E., & Rutt, J. L. (2015). Age differences in time perception and their implications 
for decision making across the life span. In T. M. Hess, J. Strough, & C. E. Löckenhoff, 
(Eds.), Aging and decision making: Empirical and applied perspectives (pp. 213-233). 
San Diego, CA, US: Elsevier Academic Press. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-417148-0.00011-
X 
Peters, E., & Bruine de Bruin, W. (2012). Aging and decision skills. In M.K. Dhami, A. 
Schlottmann, & M. Waldmann (Eds.) Judgment and Decision Making as a Skill: 
Learning, Development, and Evolution (NewYork: Cambridge University Press), 113±
139. 
Restricting Future Time Perspective 18 
 
Rappange, D. R., Brouwer, W. F., & van Exel, J. (2016). A long life in good health: Subjective 
expectations regarding length and future health-related quality of life. The European 
Journal Of Health Economics, 17(5), 577-589. doi:10.1007/s10198-015-0701-1 
Rohr, M. K., John, D. T., Fung, H. H., & Lang, F. R. (2017). A three-component model of future 
time perspective across adulthood. Psychology and Aging, 32(7), 597-607. 
doi:10.1037/pag0000191 
Rosenzweig, E., & Gilovich, T. (2012). Buyer's remorse or missed opportunity? Differential 
regrets for material and experiential purchases. Journal of Personality & Social 
Psychology, 102(2), 215. doi:10.1037/a0024999 
Rutt, J. L., & Löckenhoff, C. E. (2016). Age patterns in mental representations of time: 
Underlying constructs and relevant covariates. Experimental Aging Research, 42(3), 289-
306. doi:10.1080/0361073X.2016.1156975 
Schaie, K. W. (1965). A general model for the study of developmental problems. Psychological 
Bulletin, 64(2), 92-107.  
Segerstrom, S. C., Geiger, P. J., Combs, H. L., & Boggero, I. A. (2016). Time perspective and 
social preference in older and younger adults: Effects of self-regulatory fatigue. 
Psychology and Aging, 31(6), 594-604. doi:10.1037/pag0000104 
Shook, N. J., Ford, C., Strough, J., Delaney, R., & Barker, D. (2017). In the moment and feeling 
good: Age differences in mindfulness and positive affect. Translational Issues in 
Psychological Science, 3(4), 338-347.  
Strough, J., Bruine de Bruin, W., & Parker, A. M., Lemaster, P., Pichayayothin, N., & Delaney, 
R. (2016). Hourglass half-full or half-empty? Future time perspective and preoccupation 
Restricting Future Time Perspective 19 
 
with negative events across the life span. Psychology and Aging, 31(6), 558-573. doi: 
10.1037/pag0000097 
Strough, J., Karns, T., & Schlosnagle, L. (2011). Decision making heuristics and biases across 
the life span. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1235, 57-74.  
Strough, J., Schlosnagle, L., & DiDonato, L. (2011). Understanding decisions about sunk costs 
IURPROGHUDQG\RXQJHUDGXOWV¶perspectives. The Journals of Gerontology, Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 66(6), 681-686. DOI 10.1093/geronb/gbr057 
Strough, J., Schlosnagle, L., Karns, T., Lemaster, P., & Pichayayothin, N. (2014). No time to 
waste: Restricting life-span temporal horizons decreases the sunk-cost fallacy. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 27(1), 78-94. DOI: 10.1002/bdm.1781 
Tsiros, M. (2009). Releasing the regret lock: Consumer response to new alternatives after a sale. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 35(6), 1039-1059. doi:10.1086/593698 
Tykocinski, O., Israel, R., & Pittman, T. S. (2004). Inaction inertia in the stock market. Journal 
of Applied Social Psychology, 34(6), 1166-1175. doi:10.1111/j.1559-
1816.2004.tb02001.x 
Tykocinski, O. E., Pittman, T. S., & Tuttle, E. E. (1995). Inaction inertia: Foregoing future 
benefits as a result of an initial failure to act. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(5), 793-803. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.68.5.793 
Van Putten, M., Zeelenberg, M., & van Dijk, E. (2007). Decoupling the past from the present 
attenuates inaction inertia. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 20(1), 65-79. 
doi:10.1002/bdm.541 
Restricting Future Time Perspective 20 
 
Van Putten, M., Zeelenberg, M., & van Dijk, E. (2009). Dealing with missed opportunities: 
Action vs. state orientation moderates inaction inertia. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45(4), 808-815. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.05.0 
Van Putten, M., Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, E., & Tykocinski, O. E. (2013). Inaction inertia. 
European Review of Social Psychology, 24(1), 123-159. 
doi:10.1080/10463283.2013.841481 
Wrosch, C., Bauer, I., & Scheier, M. F. (2005). Regret and Quality of Life Across the Adult Life 
Span: The Influence of Disengagement and Available Future Goals. Psychology & Aging, 
20(4), 656-670. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.20.4.657 
Zeelenberg, M., Nijstad, B. A., van Putten, M., & van Dijk, E. (2006). Inaction inertia, regret, 
and valuation: A closer look. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
101(1), 89-104. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.11.004 
  
Restricting Future Time Perspective 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Limited future time perspective for restricted (se=1.88), expansive (se=1.70) and 
control (se=1.75) instruction groups. Higher scores indicate more limited future time perspective.   
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Figure 2. Purchasing likelihood when prior purchasing opportunity was missed versus not missed 
by experimental group.  Higher scores indicate greater purchasing likelihood. 
  
Experimental Group 
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Supplementary Analyses of Sunk-Cost Scenarios 
Methods 
A separate group of 737 participants (M=67.14, SD=10.90, range 22-97) saw a pair of 
sunk-cost scenarios from Strough, Schlosnagle, Karns, Lemaster & Pichayayothin (2014). The 
first portrayed a sunk-cost scenario about deciding whether to continue to eat a paid-for dessert 
after feeling full. The second scenario was the same except the dessert was free. Participants 
indicated their decision on a scale that ranged from 1= definitely stop eating, to 6=  definitely 
continue eating.  
Participants received the same future time perspective intervention about imagining 
limited or expansive future as those who saw the inaction inertia scenarios. A no-instruction 
control group was also included. After making the decision, participants rated the same three 
items assessing whether the intervention changed limited future time perspective when making 
the decisions. 
Results 
Sunk-cost bias was evident, as shown in greater rated likelihood of continuing to eat a 
dessert, even after feeling full, when it was paid for (M=2.25, SD=1.60) versus free (M=2.12, 
SD=1.60), t (736)=-2.75, p=.006. For each participant, we computed a sunk-cost bias score by 
subtracting the rated willingness of continuing to eat the free dessert from the rated willingness 
of continuing to eat the dessert that was paid for. Larger scores indicated greater sunk-cost bias. 
The correlation between age and sunk-cost bias was small r=-.03 and nonsignificant, p>.25.  
The future time perspective intervention did not yield expansive (M=3.32 SD=1.81), limited 
(M=3.56, SD=1.83) and control (M=3.24 SD=1.77) groups that differed in views of limited time 
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when making the decision, F(2,707)=2.14, p Ș2p =.006. Accordingly, the intervention did 
not influence sunk-cost bias F  S!Ș2p=.00. 
$PRGHUDWLRQDQDO\VLVXVLQJ+D\HV¶352&(6S macro showed that the intervention was 
not moderated by age when comparing the two intervention groups to the control group 
t(5,731)=-1.15, p=.250, 95% CI [-.030, .008] or the intervention groups to each other t(5,731)=-
.38, p=.70, 95% CI [-.025, .017].  
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Supplementary Tables 
 
Table 1 
All Participants: Study Variable Correlations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Age 
 
 
- 
 
.10* 
 
-.06 
 
.01 
 
-.31*** 
 
.02 
2. Limited Future Time 
Perspective 
 
 - .09* .07 -.17***  .17*** 
3. Purchasing Likelihood: 
Missed Opportunity 
 
  -  .58*** .10** -.04 
4. Purchasing Likelihood: 
Opportunity not missed 
 
   - .12** -.08* 
5. Fluid Cognition     - -.26*** 
       
6. Self-Rated Health      - 
Note. n = 700, p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***  
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Table 2 
Expansive Group: Study Variable Correlations  
 
Note. n = 244, p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Age 
 
 
- 
 
.26*** 
 
-.05 
 
.02 
 
-.30*** 
 
.08 
2. Limited Future Time 
Perspective 
 
 - -.004 -.02 -.21**  .19** 
3. Purchasing Likelihood: 
Missed Opportunity 
 
  -  .62*** .13* -.17** 
4. Purchasing Likelihood: 
Opportunity not missed 
 
   - .23*** -.24*** 
5. Fluid Cognition     - -.27*** 
       
6. Self-Rated Health      - 
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Table 3 
Restricted Group: Study Variable Correlations  
 
Note. n = 220,  p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Age 
 
 
- 
 
-.02 
 
-.09 
 
-.13 
 
-.29*** 
 
-.10 
2. Limited Future Time 
Perspective 
 
 - .29*** .33*** -.04  .06 
3. Purchasing Likelihood: 
Missed Opportunity 
 
  -  .61*** .10 .02 
4. Purchasing Likelihood: 
Opportunity not missed 
 
   - .08 .07 
5. Fluid Cognition     - -.12 
       
6. Self-Rated Health      - 
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Table 4  
Control Group: Study Variable Correlations  
Note. n = 236, p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
 
 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
1. Age 
 
 
- 
 
.06 
 
-.04 
 
.08 
 
-.31*** 
 
.04 
2. Limited Future Time 
Perspective 
 
 - .05 -.01 -.28***  .28*** 
3. Purchasing Likelihood: 
Missed Opportunity 
 
  -  .51*** .10 .02 
4. Purchasing Likelihood: 
Opportunity not missed 
 
   - .11 -.12 
5. Fluid Cognition     - -.35*** 
       
6. Self-Rated Health      - 
